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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co.:
Abandonment of Appeal in North Carolina
It is a well settled rule in North Carolina that appealing a case' removes
it from the jurisdiction of the trial court. Thereafter, while the appeal is
pending, the trial judge is without further authority over the case. 2 The
general rule, however, is subject to the exception or qualification that "the
trial judge, after notice and on proper showing, may adjudge the appeal has
been abandoned" and thereby regain jurisdiction of the cause. 3 In the recent
case of Bowen v. Hodge Motor .Co. ,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court
I. N.C.R. App. P. 3(a), (b), enacted in June 1975, continues the tiaditional code practice
that permitted an appeal to be taken from judgment either orally at trial or by written notice.
See Code of Civil Procedure of N.C. § 300 (1868) (presently codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-279 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
2. American Floor Mach. Co. v. Dixon, 260 N.C. 732,735-36, 133 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1963);
Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 375, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1947); Bledsoe v.
Nixon, 69 N.C. 81 (1873); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-294 (1969); 2 A. MCINTOSH. NORTH CAROUNA
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1799, at 236-37 (1956).
The result of this rule is that oral notice of appeal given in open court forecloses postverdict motions for relief from judgment at the trial court level that would otherwise have been
available prior to the appeal. N.C.R. App. P. 3 points out the timetable advantage of giving
written notice of appeal rather than oral notice. Written notice of appeal must be given within 10
days after the entry of judgment. N.C.R. App. P. 3(c), however, contains an important
innovation derived from FED. R. App. P. 4(a) which "causes the running of appeal time to be
tolled by the filing of a post-verdict moti6n uiider either Rule 50, 52, or 59 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, with the period recommencing upon the entry of an order upon the motion." N.C.
App. P. 3, Drafting Comm. Note. Prior to the enactment of rule 3(c), this effect was given only
to N.C.R. Civ. P. 59 (iew trial) motions. N.C.R. App. P. 3, Drafting Comm. Note. Thus, giving
written notice of appeal allows time to consider alternate post-verdict motions whereas immediate oral notice of appeal removes jurisdiction from the trial court and forecloses postverdict motions at the trial court level. Such motions may nevertheless be entertained if the
appellant abandons his appeal or falls within the term rule exception to the general rule. See
note 3 and accompanying text infra. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1448 & Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977) (trial court retains jurisdiction after a criminal defendant has given oral
or written notice of appeal for any time remaining in the 10 day appeal period). The problem,
inherent in oral notice of appeal, does not arise in the federal courts, which permit only written
notice of appeal. See FED. R. App. P. 3(a).
3. American Floor Mach. Co. v. Dixon, 260 N.C. 732,735-36, 133 S.E.2d 659,662 (1963).
In addition, there are two other exceptions to the general rule. "[ihe trial judge retains
jurisdiction over the cause (1) during the session in which the judgment appealed from was
rendered [the term rule exception] and (2) for the purpose of settling the case on appeal."
Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633, 635-36, 234 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1977); see Hoke v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 375-76, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-283 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (second exception); N.C.R. App. P. 11(c).
4. 292 N.C. 633, 234 S.E.2d 748 (1977).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

clarified whether an appearance of the parties before the trial court on a postverdict motion constitutes an abandonment of appeal. The Bowen court held
that plaintiffs' motion for a voluntary dismissal and the appearance of the
parties at a hearing on the motion pending an appeal did not constitute an
abandonment of the appeal and consequently did not revest jurisdiction of
5
the cause in the trial judge.

Plaintiffs in Bowen brought an action for property damage to their
automobile allegedly resulting from defendant's negligent repair. 6 The trial
court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of
plaintiffs' case and again at the close of all the evidence. On the following
day, the judge reconsidered and granted defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. Plaintiffs subsequently gave notice of appeal in open court. 7 Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a rule 41(a)(2)8 motion for voluntary dismissal without

prejudice. 9 After the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for voluntary
dismissal,' 0 defendant filed a motion to vacate the order allowing the
dismissal on the ground that plaintiffs' notice of appeal from the directed
verdict divested the trial court of jurisdiction." Defendant appealed the
5. Id. at 638, 234 S.E.2d at 751.
6. Id. at 634, 234 S.E.2d at 748.
7. Id. at 634, 234 S.E.2d at 749.
8. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l) provides that plaintiffs have a right to a voluntary dismissal
without order of the court "(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the plaintiff rests
his case, or; (ii)by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action." Rule 41(a)(2) provides that, except as provided in 41(a)(1), "an action or any claim
• . . shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the judge and upon
such terms and conditions as justice requires." Id. 41(a)(2).
9. The N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) motion was grounded upon additional evidence that had
not been presented at trial and that was in part not known to plaintiffs' attorney at that time. 292
N.C. at 635, 234 S.E.2d at 749.
10. On appeal in Bowen, the question whether a rule 41(a)(2) motion could be granted
after the entry of a directed verdict was raised. Although the supreme court did not reach the
issue, the court of appeals concluded that a voluntary dismissal could be granted after the entry
of a directed verdict, noting that "[t]he rule prescribes no time limit on the right of the plaintiff
to move for a voluntary dismissal with the court's permission" and that there was no showing
that the trial judge had abused his discretion when he granted the motion. 29 N.C. App. 463,
466-67, 224 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1976). In support of its conclusion, the court of appeals cited Kelly
v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 158, 179 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1971) (stating in dicta
that "[w]hen a motion for a directed verdict . . '. is granted, the defendant is entitled to
judgment unless the court permits a voluntary dismissal of the action under Rule 41 (a)(2)"), and
King v. Lee, 279 N.C. 100, 107, 181 S.E.2d 400, 404-05 (1971) (after sustaining the trial court's
grant of a motion for a directed verdict, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court
for the purpose of permitting plaintiff to consider making a motion for a voluntary dismissal). 29 N.C. App. at 466-67, 224 S.E.2d at 702. See generally W. SIHtUFORD, NORTH
CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 41-3 to -5 (1975).
11. 292 N.C. at 635, 234 S.E.2d at 749. After plaintiffs' notice of appeal and the court's
direction to defendant to present judgment, the notation "Court expires" appears in the court's
minutes. Id. The supreme court upheld the court of appeals' decision that the session of court
had adjourned. Since the session of court at which the appeal was entered had ended, the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion under the term rule exception. Id. at 63839, 234 S.E.2d at 751; see note 3 supra.
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order allowing plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal and the denial of his motion to
dismiss the order for lack of jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding on the basis of the North
Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Sink v. Easter,12 that plaintiffs' rule
41(a)(2) motion and the subsequent appearance of the parties at the hearing
on the motion constituted an abandonment of plaintiffs' appeal from the
directed verdict. 13 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, pointing to Wiggins v. Bunch' 4 as the controlling case. 15 The
supreme court also explained that the court of appeals' reliance on Sink was
misplaced and that Sink "should not be interpreted as holding that the mere
filing of a motion . . . and the appearance at a hearing thereon16 constitutes
an abandonment of the prior appeal, nothing else appearing."
Historically, the qualification that a trial judge can, upon proper showing, judge an appeal abandoned applied principally to situations in which an
appellant failed to prosecute his appeal. 17 When an appellant had not timely
docketed the appeal, the appellee could either move in the supreme court to
docket and dismiss the appeal according to rule II, section 7 of the Rules of
Practice in the Supreme Court of North Carolina 18 or have the superior
court, upon proper notice, determine that the appellant had abandoned his
appeal and proceed in the case as if no appeal had been taken. 19 The
alternative of having the appeal adjudged abandoned at the trial court level
was a product of case law; 10 the essential procedures constituting an abandonment were not delineated as they were for the docket and dismiss rule.
12. 288 N.C. 183, 217 S.E.2d 532 (1975).
13. 29 N.C. App. 463, 466, 224 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1976). The court of appeals also relied on

Reavis v. Campbell, 27 N.C. App. 231, 218 S.E.2d 873 (1975), which followed Sink in holding
that, pending appeal from summary judgment, the hearing on plaintiff's subsequent motion to

set aside summary judgment constituted an adjudication by the trial court that plaintiff's prior
appeal had been abandoned.
14. 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971); see text accompanying notes 49-56 infra.

15. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 750; see text accompanying note 57 infra.
16. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
17. See Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C. 266, 267 (1885).

18. N.C. Sup. Ct. R. II, § 7, 89 N.C. 598 (1884), stated that:
If the appellant in a civil action shall fail to bring up and file a transcript of the record

before the call of causes from the district from which it comes is concluded during the
week appropriated to the district, at a term of this court in which such transcript is
required to be filed, the appellee, on exhibiting the certificate of the clerk of the court

from which the appeal comes, or a certified transcript of the record.

. . may

move to

have the appeal docketed and dismissed at appellant's cost, with leave to the appellant
during the term and after notice to the appellee, to apply for the re-docketing of the
cause.
Avery v. Pritchardincorrectly cited id. II, § 8 as the docket and dismiss procedure. 93 N.C.

266, 267 (1885). Rule II, § 8 provided that an appeal should not be reinstated until appellant paid
or offered to pay appellee's costs of having the appeal dismissed under § 7.
19. Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C. 266, 267 (1885).

20. Avery v. Pritchardwas one of the first cases to state the abandonment rule. See id.
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The trial courts, however, consistent with rule II, section 7,21 have required
that an appellee seeking an adjudication of abandonment prove that the
record and transcript were not docketed on time. 22 The rationale behind both

procedures was that an appellee should have the fruit of his judgment
promptly and thus is entitled to have an appeal that was taken but not
prosecuted dismissed. 23
The modern counterpart to the procedures allowing an appellee to
dismiss an appeal for failure of the .appellant to comply with the rules for
prosecuting an appeal is rule 25 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 24 whichhas its origin in part in rule II, section*7 of the Rules of

Practice in the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 5 Rule 25 dispenses with
the docket and dismiss procedure but continues the traditional authority of
the trial court to dismiss appeals prior to docketing upon an appropriate
showing. The rule makes explicit what was implicit in the abandonment
procedure: first, that the method for having an appeal adjudged abandoned
is a motion to dismiss by the appellee; and second, that the "proper
showing" to support the motion consists of affidavits or copies of the record
showing appellant's failure to take timely action or otherwise prosecute the
appeal.26
There are no provisions governing dismissal of an appeal by an appellant in either the old Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court of North
21. See note 18 supra.
22. See Pentuff v. Park, 195 N.C. 609, 611, 143 S.E. 139, 140 (1928).
23. Jordan v. Simmons, 175 N.C. 537, 540, 95 S.E. 919, 921 (1918) (concurring opinion)
(attacking failure to perfect appeals as a cause of delay in the qourts and endorsing adjudications of abandonment as the speedier of the two methods); Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C. 266, 267
(1885).
24. The North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure supersede the Rules of Practice in
the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the Rules of Practice in the Appellate Court of North
Carolina. See 4A N.C. GEN. STAT. app. I (Cum. Supp. 1977). N.C.R. App. P. 25-states:
If after giving notice of appeal from any court, commission, or commissioner the
appellant shall fail within the times allowed by these rules or by order of court to take
any action required to present the appeal for decision, the appeal may on motion of
any other party be dismissed. Prior to the docketing of an appeal in the appellate court
motions to dismiss are made to the court, commission, or commissioner from which
appeal has been taken; after an appeal has been docketed in an appellate court motions
to dismiss are made to that court.
The Drafting Committee comments that the "rule states a blanket authority in the appropriate
courts to dismiss cases on appeal for failure to take any timely action in the appellate process,
from serving proposed case on appeal to filing the record on appeal" except that failure to file
timely briefs is dealt with separately. Id., Drafting Comm. Note. The rule also allows the court
to excuse untimely action for good cause. This replaces the reinstatement procedure of N.C.
Sup. Ct. R. II, §§ 7, 8, 89 N.C. 598 (1884); see note 18 supra.
25. N.C.R. App. P. 25, Drafting Comm. Note. N.C. Sup. Ct. R. II, §§ 7, 8 was renumbered as rules 17 and 18 in 1889. See 104 N.C. 633 (1889). Rules 17 and 18 continued basically
unchanged and were incorporated as N.C. Ct. App. R. 17, 18, 1 N.C. App. 632, 639 (1968).
26. N.C.R. App. P. 25.
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Carolina, 27 the Rules of Practice in the Appellate Court of North Carolina 28
or the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 29 Furthermore, there is
little early case law developing the procedure by which an appellant could
abandon an appeal. Appellants can, nevertl)eless, abandon their appeals.
Since 1947, the original limitation of the abandonment rule to appellees has
apparently been discarded. 30 Both appellants and appellees can prove abandonment and thereby revest jurisdiction in the trial court. Moreover, the
"proper showing" requirement of the abandonment rule has been extended
to appellants. 31 Thus, an appellant could, in the discretion of the trial court,
withdraw his appeal by making application for leave to dismiss and by
showing that the appellee would not be prejudiced by the withdrawal.
The first indication by the North Carolina Supreme Court that a motion
in the trial court by an appellant while his appeal was pending could
constitute an abandonment of that appeal came in Leggett v. SmithDouglass Co. 32 Plaintiffs in Leggett appealed an order of the trial court
sustaining defendants' demurrer and dismissing the action. Plaintiff-appellants gave notice of appeal to the supreme court but subsequently failed to
draft and serve a copy of the case on defendants; the appeal was never
perfected.3 3 Thereafter, appellants took a voluntary nonsuit 34 in superior
court and instituted another action against defendants. The state supreme
court held that under those circumstances "the taking of a voluntary nonsuit
27. 254 N.C. 783 (1961) (superseded 1975).
28. 1 N.C. App. 632 (1968) (superseded 1975).
29. But cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1450 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (express statutory authority
for withdrawal of appeal by a criminal defendant).
30. In Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 376, 42 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1947),
where the general rule and its exceptions were first consolidated, the abandonment rule was
cited as a qualification to the general rule that jurisdiction is removed from the trial court
pending appeal without reference to who may invoke the rule or under what conditions it may
be invoked. Prior to this time the abandonment rule as set forth in Avery v. Pritchard, 93 N.C.
266 (1885); see text accompanying note 17 supra, had been cited only in cases in which the
appellee was dismissing an appeal not prosecuted by the appellant. Avery was cited only once

after Hoke. See Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506, 511, 78 S.E.2d 334, 339 (1953). Thereafter,
Hoke was cited for the proposition that an appellant could abandon his appeal at the trial court
prior to docketing. See, e.g., McDowell v. Town of Kure Beach, 251 N.C. 818, 112 S.E.2d 390
(1960); State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959); Sinclair v. Moore Cent. R.R., 228
N.C. 389, 45 S.E.2d 555 (1947). The recent litigation raising the abandonment issue has resulted
from appellants' attempts to abandon appeal in order to seek other affirmative relief at the trial
court level. See text accompanying notes 6-11 & 48-53 infra.
31. McDowell v. Town of Kure Beach, 251 N.C. 818, 821, 824-25, 112 S.E.2d 390, 393,
395 (1960); accord, Town of Davidson v. Stough, 258 N.C. 23, 24, 127 S.E.2d 762, 763 (1962).
32. 257 N.C. 646, 127 S.E.2d 222 (1962).
33. Id. at 648, 127 S.E.2d at 223.
34. The nonsuit was pursuant to former § 1-224,2 Hen. IV c. 7 (1400), as adopted by Rev.
Code of N.C. ch. 31, § 110 (1855) (formerly codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-224 (1954))
(repealed 1967). Prior to the adoption of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff
was allowed to take a voluntary nonsuit at any time before the verdict as long as the defendant
had not asserted a counterclaim or a demand for affirmative relief. Id.

578
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before the clerk of the superior court is tantamount to an abandonmelit or
withdraWal of the appeal." 35 The notion that an appeal could be abandoned
without a formal motion for abandonment was later endorsed in Sink v.
37
Easter36 and relied upon by the court of appeals in Bowen.
Sink v. Easter involved a complex procedural tangle 38 that the Bowen
court likened to a "Gordian knot." ' 39 On March 21, 1974 the trial judge
entered a judgment granting defendant's rule 60(b)(6) 40 motion and dismissing plaintiff's case for lack of jurisdiction. In response, plaintiff filed a rule
60(b)(1) and (2) motion for relief from judgment on grounds of mistake,
inadvertance and newly discovered evidence. 41 On the same day, the trial
judge filed a Correction of Judgment and an order denying plaintiff's rule
60(b) motion.42 Plaintiff gave notice of appeal from both of these actions by
the trial court. 43 Thereafter, the trial judge, acting on his own motion, 4 set
35. 257 N.C. at 648, 127 S.E.2d at 224; accord, Williams v. Asheville Contracting Co., 257
N.C. 769, 770, 127 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1962) (per curiam).
36. 288 N.C. at 198, 217 S.E.2d at 542.
37. 29 N.C. App. 463, 465-66, 224 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1976). The supreme court in Bowen,
however, summarily distinguished Leggett. Leggett "dealt with [North -Carolina's] old voluntary nonsuit practice under which plaintiff had an absolute right voluntarily to nonsuit his action
without prejudice up to the time a verdict was rendered against him." 292 N.C. at 638, 234
S.E.2d at 751. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), which was at issue in Bowen., does not convey an
absolute right to dismiss the action without prejudice. The court further distinguished Leggett
on the basis that plaintiff had failed to perfect his appeal prior to taking the nonsuit. Although in
Williams v. Asheville Contracting Co., 257 N.C. 769, 127 S.E.2d 554 (1962) (per curiam), a case
following Leggett, the time for perfecting the appeal had not expired at the time plaintiff filed a
nonsuit, the Bowen court pointed out that plaintiff thereafter failed to perfect the appeal and it
was subsequently dismissed by the supreme court. 292 N.C. at 638, 234 S.E.24'at 751.
38. Sink involved two actions c9mmenced on September 3, 1971, for personal injuries and
medical expenses resulting from an automobile accident. One action was instituted by Sherry
Sink for injuries and expenses incurred subsequent to her majority; the other was instituted by
Sherry Sink's father, James Sink, for Sherry's medical expenses prior to her majority. James
Sink's action was litigated and ultimately remanded by the North Carolina Supreme Court with
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to insufficiency of service of process. Sink v.
Easter, 284 NC. 555, 202 S.E.2d 138 (1974).
Sherry Sink's action remained in limbo until after James Sink's action was dismissed.
Defendant then filed a N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (relief from judgment) motion to dismiss Sherry
Sink's action on the ground that the court's prior denial of defendant's rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss filed in March 1972 was "irregular and void" by reason of the decision in James Sink's
action. Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. at 188, 217 S.E.2d at 535. The Sink court pointed out that
defendant's rule 60(b)(6) motion was mislabeled since it was made in response to the denial of
defendant's rule 12(b)(5) (insufficiency of service) motion, an interlocutory order, while rule
60(b) applies only to final judgments. The Sink court elected, therefore, to treat defendant's
rule 60(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel and to treat
the trial court's granting of the rule 60(b)(6) motion as a granting of a rule 56 motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 196-97, 217 S.E.2d at 540-41.
39. 292 N.C. at 636-37, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
40. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); see note 38 supra.
41. 288 N.C. at 190, 217 S.E.2d at 536.
42. Id. at 190, 217 S.E.2d at 536-37.
43. Id. at 190, 217 S.E.2d at 537 (appeal from corrected judgment granting defendant's
N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion); id. at 191, 217 S.E.2d at 537 (appeal from denial of plaintiff's
N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l), (2) motion).
44. Since this action took place at a new session of court, the trial judge no longer had

1978]

ABANDONMENT OF APPEAL

aside his order denying plaintiff's rule 60(b) motion because he had erred in
determining that he was without discretion to consider the motion. 45 The
trial judge proceeded, over defendant's objection, to conduct a hearing on
plaintiff's motion.
The question before the supreme court in Sink was whether plaintiff
had properly abandoned her appeal from the denial of the rule 60(b) motion
in order to revest jurisdiction in the trial court. In answering this question
affirmatively, the supreme court construed the hearing on the rule 60(b)
motion attended by both parties as constituting an adjudication by the trial
court that plaintiff, by appearing at the hearing, gave proper notice of her
intention to abandon her prior appeal from the denial of her motion. 46 The
court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider plaintiff's
60(b) motion.4 7
The supreme court in Bowen, in rejecting Sink's holding that the
proceedings alone constituted an abandonment of appeal,4 8 gave controlling
authority to an earlier decision, Wiggins v. Bunch.49 The issue in Wiggins
was whether motions filed pursuant to rules 5950 and 60,51 pending appeal,
affected the general rule that an appeal removes the case from the jurisdiction of the trial court. 52 The trial court had granted defendants' motion to
dismiss at the close of plaintiff's evidence; plaintiff gave notice of appeal in
open court. Nearly two months after the judgment of dismissal, plaintiff
moved to set aside the judgment and for a new trial pursuant to rules 59 and
60 on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. After a hearing on the
motion, the trial court set aside the dismissal and granted plaintiff a new
trial.5 3
The supreme court held that, because the time limit for a rule 59 motion
is ten days after the entry of judgment, 54 rule 59 did not apply and that if
jurisdiction of the case under the term rule exception. Id. at 198, 217 S.E.2d at 542; see note 3

supra.
45. 288 N.C. at 190-91, 217 S.E.2d at 536. "As is recognized in many cases, a motion for
relief under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and appellate
review is limited to determining whether the court abused its discretion." Id. at 198,217 S.E.2d
at 541.

46. Id. at 198, 217 S.E.2d at 542.
47. The events in Sink were further complicated because plaintiff gave notice of appeal on
two issues. See text accompanying notes 62-71 infra.
48. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 749.

49. 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971); see text accompanying note 14 supra.
50. N.C.R. Civ. P. 59; see note 2 supra.
51. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60.

52. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
53. 280 N.C. at 107, 184 S.E.2d at 879.
54. N.C.R. Civ. P. 59(b) states: "A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10
days after entry of the judgment."
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plaintiff were entitled to any relief it would have to be under rule 60.55
Wiggins concluded that the general rule that an appeal divests the trial court
of jurisdiction was not changed by the time limits for moving under rules 59
56
and 60 of the newly adopted North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hence, even though plaintiff was within the time limit of rule 60 when he
made his motion, the prior appeal had removed jurisdiction from the trial
court, and the trial court was, therefore, without authority to vacate the
judgment.
In giving controlling authority to Wiggins, Bowen emphasized that,
although the court in Wiggins recognized the qualification to the general
rule that an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction, 57 it found no
occasion to apply the qualification in that case. 5 8 Instead, Wiggins held that
motions filed pursuant to rules 59 or 60 could not properly be addressed to
the trial court pending appeal. 59 Moreover, according to Bowen, "[t]here
was no suggestion [in Wiggins] that the mere filing of the motions and the
appearance of the parties for a hearing thereon constituted an abandonment
of the appeal by the moving party.' '6 If the filing of the motions and the
appearance of the parties at a hearing did constitute an abandonment, the
Wiggins court could have found an abandonment of appeal in that case. The
Bowen court attempted to reconcile the apparent conflict between the
implication in Wiggins that plaintiff's appearance at a hearing on his rule 59
and 60 motions did not constitute an abandonment of appeal and the express
55. 280 N.C. at 109, 184 S.E.2d at 880. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b) states: "The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this section does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation." Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on
the grounds of newly discovered evidence under rule 60(b)(2). 280 N.C. at 107, 184 S.E.2d at
879.
56. 280 N.C. at 111, 184 S.E.2d at 882. The court was guided by interpretations of the
nearly identical Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 59, 60. See Norman v.
Young, 422 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1970) (when defendant filed an appeal before arguing his FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) motion, the case was taken out of the trial court's jurisdiction); Switzer v. Marzall,
95 F. Supp. 721 (D.D.C. 1951) (when a motion for a new trial is filed and an appeal is taken
thereafter, the case is removed from the trial court which no longer has jurisdiction over the
rule 60(b) motion); Daniels v. Goldberg, 8 F.R.D. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (the district court has
power to correct clerical errors in the record before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court
and thereafter with leave of the appellate court under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a), but this does not
confer on the district court the power to vacate a judgment after an appeal has been filed);
cf. Keyser v. Farr, 105 U.S. 265 (1881); Draper v. Davis, 102 U.S. 370 (1880) (in pre-Rules
setting, after an appeal was allowed and security for appeal taken, the lower court was without
jurisdiction).
57. See 280 N.C. at 108, 184 S.E.2d at 880.
58. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
59. 280 N.C. at 111, 184 S.E.2d at 882. Plaintiff in Bowen, by making a N.C.R. Civ. P.
41(a)(2) motion for a voluntary dismissal grounded on newly discovered evidence rather than a
rule 59 motion, may have been trying to avoid the effect of Wiggins. Sink, discussed at text
accompanying notes 38-47 supra, was not decided until several weeks after the 41(a)(2) motion
was made in Bowen.
60. 292 N.C. at 636, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
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statement in Sink that the appearance of plaintiff at a hearing on her 60(b)
by narrowing Sink in light of later
motion did constitute an abandonment
61
procedural events in the latter case.
In doing so, however, the supreme court has apparently oversimplified
the analysis in Sink. The Bowen court treated the procedural events in Sink
as if there were only one appeal and interpreted Sink as holding that
plaintiff's abandonment of her rule 60(b) motion was effective only in
relation to plaintiff's later express abandonment of the same appeal.6 2 The
Sink court, however, had expressly maintained that it was "important to
remember" 63 that two appeals were pending: an appeal from the order of
dismissal and an appeal from the order denying plaintiff's rule 60(b) mo65
tion.64 Plaintiff in Sink did not expressly abandon her rule 60(b) appeal,
but rather expressly abandoned her appeal from the judgment of dismissal
subsequent to the initial, implied abandonment. 66 Therefore, even if the
appeal from the rule 60(b) motion was effectively abandoned by the appearance of the parties at the hearing, the trial court in Sink still did not have
sufficient jurisdiction to grant the rule 60(b) motion because the first appeal
from the judgment of dismissal was still pending.
When the Sink court held that the hearing on the rule 60(b) motion
constituted an abandonment of the appeal from the denial of that motion, it
did not claim that the hearing on the rule 60(b) motion also constituted an
abandonment of the appeal from the judgment of dismissal. On the contrary,
Sink recognized that after the trial court regained jurisdiction over the rule
60(b) motion by virtue of the abandonment, it then faced the only issue that
was before the court in Wiggins-the effect of a pending appeal on the trial
court's power to grant relief under the 60(b) motion. 67 Following the
practice of the federal courts, 68 the Sink court suggested that it could have
61. Id. at 636-37, 234 S.E.2d at 750.
62. "Plaintiff's position relative to her appeal on 1 April 1974 [the proceedings at which

the trial court reconsidered its prior denial of plaintiff's rule 60(b) motion] must be considered in
the context of her later express abandonment of that appeal and the court's order allowing the
abandonment." Id. at 637-38, 234 S.E.2d at 750 (second emphasis added).
63. 288 N.C. at 198, 217 S.E.2d at 542.
64. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
65. 288 N.C. at 191, 198, 217 S.E.2d at 535-36, 542; see text accompanying notes 45-47
supra.
66. 288 N.C. at 200, 217 S.E.2d at 543.
67. Id. at 199, 217 S.E.2d 542; see 280 N.C. at 110, 184 S.E.2d at 881.
68. Earlier federal cases held that the district court had no power to consider a rule 60(b)
motion pending appeal and required the party making the motion to first present his grounds to
the appellate court which could remand th&case or give permission to the district court to rule
on the motion. I I C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2873, at 26365 (1973). The practice of making a 60(b) motion in the appellate court is referred to in Wiggins,
where the court stated that plaintiffs had failed to make the 60(b) motion in the appellate court
within the time limit of the rule. 280 N.C. at 111, 184 S.E.2d at 882; accord, Rhodes v.
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treated the order granting plaintiff relief under rule 60(b) as a " 'clear
indication' " of how the trial court would rule were the cause remanded to
the trial court. 69 Remanding the cause became unnecessary, however, because plaintiff expressly abandoned her appeal from judgment of dismissal
prior to the granting of the rule 60(b) motion. 70 The Sink court stated that
only after plaintiff expressly abandoned her appeal from dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction by successfully filing a motion to withdraw the appeal was
the trial judge revested with jurisdiction over the "entire cause.''71 It was
not until after this motion to withdraw the appeal from the judgment of
dismissal was granted that the trial court ruled on plaintiff's rule 60(b)
motion, set aside the judgment of dismissal and denied defendant's motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Much of the problem in Sink arises from an overly broad interpretation
that in all circumstances proceedings on a post-verdict motion made in the
trial court pending a prior appeal constitute an abandonment of that appeal.
Bowen was correct in holding that this is not a proper interpretation of Sink
and that the implied abandonment in Sink must be viewed in light of its
procedural context. 72 Bowen, however, by failing to distinguish between
the two appeals in Sink, derived the rule that an express abandonment is
required in all cases in order to revest jurisdiction in the trial court. 73 This
holding does not adequately account for the relationship between the proceedings constituting an abandonment and the later procedural events in
Sink. The Sink rule allowing the proceedings on the rule 60(b) motion to
constitute an abandonment is limited to the situation where there is an appeal
both from judgment and from a rule 60(b) motion properly made in the trial
court prior to appeal and where the abandonment only vests jurisdiction in
the trial court for the purpose of "reconsidering" the rle 60(b) motion
pending either remand or express abandonment of the still pending appeal
from judgment. 74
To hold in that narrow context, as Sink does, that the proceedings
Henderson, 14 N.C. App. 404, 409, 188 S.E.2d 565, 568 (1972); A. MCINTOSH, supra note 2,
§ 1800(7), at 242 & § 1720, at 94 (1956 & Supp. 1970).
Other cases developed a procedure, recommended by Wright and Miller, C. WRIG;HT &
A. MILLER, supra § 2873, at 256-66, and suggested by Sink, 288 N.C. at 199-200, 217 S.E.2d at

543, whereby the district court could consider the rule 60(b) motion and, if it were inclined to
grant it, application could be made to the appellate court for remand. The result is that while the

district court could deny the motion, it could not grant it until there had been a remand. 7
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60:30(2), at 420-22 (2d ed. 1970).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

288 N.C. at 199-200, 217 S.E.2d at 543.
Id.
Id. at 200, 217 S.E.2d at 543.
See text accompanying note 61 supra.
See text accompanying note 62 supra.
See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
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constituted an abandonment of the rule 60(b) appeal is not inconsistent with
Wiggins, in which the rule 60(b) motion was not made in the trial court until
after an appeal from judgment had been taken. 75 The trial court in Wiggins
never had jurisdiction over the rule 60(b) motion that could be revested.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction purportedly conveyed by the proceedings on
the motion was not to reconsider the post-verdict motion but to rule on the
pending appeal. Thus, the court's conclusion in Bowen that the filing of a
rule 41(a)(2) motion and the appearance at a hearing did not constitute an
abandonment of appeal absent express abandonment of the appeal and a
judgment of the trial court to that effect elaborates the holding in Wiggins
and clarifies the requirements for abandonment of appeal by appellants.
The need to abandon an appeal in order to seek post-verdict relief in the
76
trial court could be reduced by more cautious use of oral notice of appeal.
When it is necessary to abandon an appeal, any remaining uncertainty
surrounding the procedures for voluntary abandonment by an appellant
could be eliminated by adopting a provision for voluntary dismissal by
appellants similar to that governing dismissals by appellees. 77 The drafters
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have recognized the need for
such a provision 78 and perhaps Wiggins, Bowen and Sink reveal the need
for such a provision in North Carolina.
SUZANNE MORGAN LEARY

75. See text accompanying notes 49-56- supra.
76. See note 2 supra.

77. See note 24 and text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
78. FED. R. App. P. 42 provides:
(a) Dismissal in the District Court.
If an appeal has not been docketed, the appeal may be dismissed by the district
court upon the filing in that court of a stipulation for dismissal signed by all the parties,
or upon motion and notice by the appellant.
(b) Dismissal in the Court of Appeals.
If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding shall sign and file with the clerk of
the court of appeals an agreement that the proceeding be dismissed, specifying the
terms as to payment of costs, and shall pay whatever fees are due, the clerk shall enter
the case dismissed, but no mandate or other process shall issue without an order of the
court. An appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant upon such terms as may
be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court.

